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Abstract Trust in state institutions is a prominent explanation of social trust.
However, previous—mainly cross-sectional—analyses provide limited causal evi-
dence regarding the relationship between institutional trust and social trust and it is
thus essentially unknown whether an observed relationship reflects reverse causality
(social trust forming institutional trust), or both forms of trust reflecting deep-seated
dispositions (common confounding). Against the backdrop of the shortcomings of
previous cross-sectional analyses, this paper utilizes two Danish panel surveys
containing measures of both types of trust for the same individuals surveyed at
multiple points in time over a long time-span (up to 18 years) to address the
potentially reverse and/or spurious relationship. Using individual fixed effects and
cross-lagged panel models, the results provide strong evidence of trust in state
institutions exercising a causal impact on social trust, whereas the evidence for a
reverse relationship is limited.
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Introduction
Social trust concerns the trustworthiness of the abstract, generalized other about
whom little information exists (Robinson and Jackson 2001). As such, social trust
serves as a heuristic when individuals interact with anonymous others and is
therefore of great import in increasingly atomistic modern societies. Trustful
individuals tend to have a more positive outlook on the intentions of others, which
in turn leads to more pro-social behavior and enables cooperation for the common
good with positive consequences for society as a whole (Stolle 2001). Empirically,
the positive effects of social trust have been substantiated in a number of studies. At
the individual-level it has been shown that social trust promotes volunteering,
donations to charity and common interest organizations (Sønderskov 2011a; Uslaner
2002), tax payment (Scholz and Lubell 1998), recycling (Sønderskov 2011b), and
contributions to the provision of public goods in general (Ga¨chter et al. 2004; Tho¨ni
et al. 2012). Moreover, studies at the aggregate level—across nations or sub-
national units—show, for example, that societies inhabited by more trustful citizens,
experience higher levels of economic growth (Bjørnskov 2009; Knack and Keefer
1997), more effective democratic government (Knack 2002; Tavits 2006), and less
dishonest behavior (Neville 2012). In short: social trust promotes desirable
collective outcomes.
From the viewpoint of policy-makers and others working to improve the well-
functioning of societies, the logical follow-up question to the evidence of the
beneficial effects of social trust is how this valuable resource can be built up? This
implies understanding the roots of trust; a topic that has received considerable
scholarly attention in the past two decades with a number of dominant perspectives
crystallizing. Among the most influential perspectives is the so-called cultural
perspective, which sees trust as an enduring trait learned early in life, primarily from
parents (Dohmen et al. 2012; Uslaner 2002). According to this perspective, trust is
largely immune to subsequent experiences after its initial formation in childhood,
and therefore stable throughout life and even across generations (Uslaner 2002,
2008). By implication, the cultural account leaves little room for policy or other
measures to raise levels of trust.
Contrary to the stability implied by the cultural perspective, the broader class of
theories of trust formation referred to as experiential (Dinesen 2012a; Glanville and
Paxton 2007) emphasize how trust is formed by experiences throughout life, and
thus malleable. Following Putnam’s (1993) pathbreaking study, which identified the
vitality of civil society as a key explanation of differences in development in the
Italian regions, scholars have emphasized participation in voluntary organizations as
a prominent explanation in this regard. In essence, participating in voluntary
organizations is thought to foster social trust by stimulating repeated social
interactions between individuals. While this theoretical conjecture leaves room for
optimism with regard to raising social trust, the empirical evidence for the
proposition that participation in voluntary organizations furthers trust is sparse—
especially when reverse causality (i.e. trust leading to participation) is taken into
account (Bekkers 2012; Claibourn and Martin 2000; Stolle 2001; Uslaner 2002; van
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Ingen and Bekkers 2015). Nannestad (2008, p. 423) eloquently summarizes this in
his review of research on social [generalized] trust: ‘‘It seems that most empirical
studies have not been kind to the civic society explanation of generalized trust, and
that this is true especially for studies addressing endogeneity problems properly.’’
Given the limited evidence for the trust-generating qualities of civil society,
scholars have turned to other experiential explanations of trust. In this regard,
institutional influences have received massive attention followed by mounting
empirical support (Dinesen 2012b, 2013; Freitag and Bu¨hlmann 2009; Levi 1996;
Mishler and Rose 2001; Nannestad et al. 2014; Rothstein and Eek 2009; Rothstein
and Stolle 2008; Wang and Gordon 2011; You 2012). The theoretical rationale
underlying this perspective is that people’s perceptions of the trustworthiness of
others are informed by the rules that govern citizens’ behavior. More specifically,
the fairness and effectiveness of state institutions, e.g., the judiciary, the police or
the parliament, provide important cues about both the norms of others as well as the
incentives for behaving dishonestly. Fair and efficient state institutions form the
basis for trusting others by signaling that untrustworthy behavior is uncommon, and
will be sanctioned regardless of who commits the exploit (Rothstein and Stolle
2008).
The institutional account is experiential in the sense that people’s perceptions of
the generalized other (their social trust) are thought to be formed by their
experiences with representatives of state institutions, that is, public employees such
as bureaucrats and police officers. More specifically, the effect of such experiences
on social trust is often argued to be mediated by perceptions of the fairness and
effectiveness of state institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; You 2012; Sønderskov
and Dinesen 2014; Wang and Gordon 2011)—or what is commonly referred to as
institutional trust.1 In other words, the institutional perspective argues that
institutional quality at the macro level gives rise to positive individual-level
experiences with representative of institutions, which builds institutional trust,
which in turn influences people’s social trust. It is the latter part of this causal chain
that we are concerned with in this paper, namely the potential effect of individual-
level institutional trust on social trust.
However, concluding that elevating trust in institutions is a means for promoting
social trust would be premature in the present state of research. Specifically,
previous analyses have almost exclusively been based on cross-sectional observa-
tional data and are therefore faced with two classical challenges: ruling out the
reverse causal relationship (i.e. social trust influencing institutional trust), as well as
confounding by unobserved factors simultaneously influencing both types of trust.
Against the backdrop of the causal indeterminacy of previous studies, the main
contribution of this paper is addressing the potential problems of reverse causality
and common confounding of the relationship between institutional trust and social
trust. That is, we seek to provide causal evidence regarding the (potential) influence
1 Inspired by Zmerli et al. (2007) definition of confidence in political institutions, we define institutional
trust as an individual’s perception of the credibility, fairness, competence and transparency of state
institutions.
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of institutional trust on social trust and thereby implicitly address whether
improving institutional quality is a viable strategy for increasing social trust.
We accommodate the problems of previous cross-sectional studies by using
individual-level panel data; specifically, two Danish panel surveys containing
measures of both types of trust for the same individuals surveyed at multiple points
in time over a long time-span, as well as a large number of covariates of trust. We
address the issue of reverse causality by means of cross-lagged models and that of
common confounding by means of individual fixed effects. The results provide
strong evidence in favor of trust in state institutions exercising a causal impact on
social trust, whereas the evidence for the reverse relationship is limited.
Causal or Confounded? The Relationship Between Institutional Trust
and Social Trust
A large number of studies have demonstrated a correlation between institutional
trust and social trust at both the aggregate country-level as well as at the individual
level across different contexts and populations (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Dinesen
2011; Freitag and Bu¨hlmann 2009; Keele 2005; Mishler and Rose 2001; Nannestad
et al. 2014; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014; You 2012;
Zmerli and Netwon 2008; Zmerli et al. 2007). The problems of these studies, mainly
using observational cross-sectional data, are neatly summarized in a cross-country
analysis at the individual level, which found a strong relationship between the two
forms of trust and subsequently concluded that ‘‘this raises the matter of the origins
of these attitudes and the extent to which they overlap and reinforce each other’’
(Zmerli and Netwon 2008, p. 719). This statement embodies the two major
problems with previous analyses based on cross-sectional data. First, while
institutional trust may influence social trust, it is also plausible that the relationship
runs in the other direction (or is bidirectional). Second, given the observational
nature of the data previously employed, it is difficult to entirely rule out that any
relationship between the two types of trust is not due to confounding by factors
preceding both, e.g. deep-seated psychological traits that are partly innate or the
results of early life socialization. While methodological concerns at heart, both
challenges originate in the aforementioned distinction between cultural and
experiential accounts of social trust. We review both in turn.
As noted, the experiential perspective underlying the institutional explanation of
trust focuses on how positive experiences with representatives of (‘‘good’’)
institutions spill over to trust in institutions, which then provide the basis for social
trust. Conversely, the cultural perspective, with its emphasis on the dominance of
early-life socialization (Uslaner 2002), leaves little room for subsequent experi-
ences, including those laying the foundation for institutional trust, in forming social
trust. Hence, from this perspective, any relationship between the two forms of trust
is more likely to reflect that social trust, learned early in life, is projected on to state
institutions and their representatives resulting in institutional trust (Brehm and Rahn
1997). Similarly, focusing on the macro-level, Bjørnskov (2009) argues that high
levels of social trust lead to better governance, which may in turn have positive
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effects on trust in state institutions (see also Boix and Posner 1998). In other words,
the two theoretical perspectives on the roots of trust yield opposite predictions with
regard to the causal direction between institutional trust and social trust.
Disentangling the direction of causality between the two types of trust is very
difficult based on observational cross-sectional data. The best evidence in this
regard is the analysis by Brehm and Rahn (1997), who apply instrumental variable
techniques on repeated cross-sectional data from the US (specifically, the General
Social Survey 1972–994) to identify the bidirectional causal relationship between
the two forms of trust. They find a strong reciprocal relationship with the effect of
institutional trust on social trust being substantially stronger than the reverse
relationship. Mishler and Rose (2001) also use instrumental variable techniques to
estimate the relationship between the two types of trust, but only on one cross-
section of individuals across a number of countries. Their analysis does not show a
relationship between the two types of trust. However, as always when using
instrumental variables to identify causal effects, the results critically hinge on the
exclusion restriction (that is, the assumption of instrument exogeneity), which can
be questioned in both of the cited studies.2 Only one individual-level study has
examined the relationship between institutional trust and social trust using panel
data (Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014), and this points to a causal impact of
institutional trust on social trust with no feedback effect.3 At the aggregate level, a
time series study of US states points to the reverse relationship, although it focuses
on the narrower concept of trust in government (Keele 2005). Hence, while both
directions of causality appear theoretically plausible, there is only limited empirical
evidence regarding the causal arrows between institutional trust and social trust.
Even if institutional trust can be assumed to be exogenous to social trust, the
problem of common confounding (i.e. unobserved heterogeneity) also looms large
when using observational cross-sectional data. Again, this issue relates to the debate
about the roots of social trust. More specifically, the leading proponent of the cultural
perspective, Uslaner (2002), argues that the specific mechanism underlying parental
socialization of social trust is in fact social transmission of optimism, which he
considers a stable personality trait. This illustrates the second challenge regarding the
relationship between institutional trust and social trust, namely common confounding
by deep-rooted, enduring psychological traits. Personality traits are perhaps the most
obvious candidates in this regard. Because personality traits have been shown to be
partially innate and are generally formed early on in life (Bouchard and McGue 2003;
Costa and McCrae 1988, 1992), they may likely precede both types of trust. Indeed,
2 More specifically, many of the instruments employed for one of the two forms of trust could equally
well be argued to function as instruments for the other type of trust (e.g., victimization and cohort
dummies used as instruments for social trust, and aggregate unemployment and ideological self-
placement used as instruments for institutional trust in Brehm and Rahn (1997).
3 The present study extends parts of the analyses in Sønderskov and Dinesen (2014), which used a subset
of the data and methods employed here to explore the causal relationship between social and institutional
trust in order to substantiate that improved institutional quality helps explain increasing social trust in
Denmark. Specifically, the present study uses an additional panel data set (the SPAPS data; see below),
which allows for more refined measurement of social trust as well as controlling for personality traits. The
present study also employs fixed effects estimation, whereas Sønderskov and Dinesen (2014) solely rely
on cross sectional analyses and cross-lagged models.
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recent studies have shown that social trust is influenced by personality, either in terms
of the broader traits in the Big Five personality scheme—especially Agreeableness,
Openness and Neuroticism (Dinesen et al. 2014; Mondak and Halperin 2008)—or
more specific facets such as optimism and a sense of control (Couch and Jones 1997;
Uslaner 2002; see also Hirashi et al. 2008; Oskarsson et al. 2012). In fact, social trust
has in itself been suggested to be a facet under the trait Agreeableness in the Big Five
framework (cf. Dinesen et al. 2014). Here, our purpose is not to examine whether
social trust is a separate concept or not, but instead to highlight that social trust may
likely be rooted in personality traits one way or the other. While given less attention
than social trust, there is also research pointing to the personality correlates of
institutional trust. Mondak and Halperin (2008) show that political trust (in local
officials) is influenced by the Big Five personality traits, specifically the traits
Agreeableness and Openness.
For our purposes, the key aspect of finding that both types of trust may, in part, be
rooted in personality, is that this implies that the observed correlation between the
two may be spurious; that is, in fact reflecting confounding by personality traits,
which have remained unobserved in previous observational analyses.4 Moreover,
while we find personality to be among the most likely deep-rooted traits to influence
the two forms of trust, the same logic of potential confounding extends to other
similar traits—e.g., intelligence, which has also been shown to correlate with social
trust (Hooghe et al. 2012; Oskarsson et al. 2012; Sturgis et al. 2010). In other words,
based on previous analyses we cannot rule out confounding of the relationship
between institutional and social trust by deep-seated psychological traits.
In summary, based on the literature, there are good reasons to expect that social
trust (also) influences institutional trust, i.e., that causality works in reverse, and that
deep-founded psychological traits simultaneously influence both types of trust, i.e.,
cause common confounding. As a means for bypassing these two key challenges,
and thus provide stronger leverage for causal inference, we employ individual-level
panel data, including a rich set of control variables, as we explain below.
Research Design
The Advantages of Individual-Level Panel Data
Employing panel data allows for two types of analyses well-suited for examining
causal relationships: cross-lagged models and fixed effects models (Finkel 1995).
The main purpose of the cross-lagged—or lagged dependent variable—model is to
examine the direction of the relationship between two potentially endogenous
variables. This is examined by means of regressing each of the endogenous
variables measured at one point in time (t0) on previous levels (i.e. temporally
preceding measures; t-1 etc.) of the other endogenous variable while controlling for
previous levels of the dependent variable. In our case, this implies regressing social
4 It should be noted that Zmerli and Newton (2008) control for happiness/life satisfaction, but this can at
best be seen as a measure of very specific aspects of personality.
184 Polit Behav (2016) 38:179–202
123
trust measured at t0 on institutional trust measured at t-1 (and t-2 when three waves
exist) as well as social trust measured at t-1 (and t-2). And vice versa using
institutional trust as the dependent variable. If previous levels of institutional trust
predict future levels of social trust, while simultaneously controlling for previous
levels of social trust, it is taken as an indication of a causal effect of institutional
trust on social trust—even if the reverse relationship is also detected (see Glanville
et al. (2013) for an application to social trust). Besides addressing reversed
causality, the lagged dependent variable model also implicitly addresses confound-
ing by unobservables to some extent by means of controlling for lagged social trust,
which is likely to pick up some of the potential confounding.
More to the point, the fixed effect estimator specifically addresses confounding of
the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. This
is done by means of using only within-respondent variation in the independent and
the dependent variable. By implication, the fixed effect estimator effectively
controls for all time-invariant characteristics pertaining to the individual (e.g.
predispositions rooted in genes or early-life socialization), which may confound the
relationship between the variables of interest. In our case, this means that the
potential confounding of the relationship between the two types of trust stemming
from, e.g., innate psychological traits or early life socialization is removed by means
of the fixed effect estimator.
Despite its obvious qualities with regard to minimizing bias from omitted
variables compared to regular cross-sectional analyses, the panel design is not a
panacea for addressing confounding. Time-varying factors (e.g. experiences
occurring between the points of measurement of trust) are not controlled in the
fixed effects or the crossed lagged models. Consequently, we include a rich set of
control variables when examining the relationship in both the cross-lagged models
and, when meaningful, in the fixed effects models. This also serves the additional
purpose of judging the relative merits of institutional trust in explaining social trust
compared to other important predictors. In addition to the standard socioeconomic
(education, income and unemployment) and demographic (gender, age and place of
birth) control variables, we also include measures of the Big Five personality traits
(Costa and McCrae 1988)—likely confounders of the relationship between the two
types of trust as noted above—in one of the cross-lagged models.5 Controlling for
the Big Five personality traits thus rules out one important potential source of
confounding overlooked in previous analyses. Finally, we also control for
religiosity, associational involvement and, as indicated earlier, optimism. Religios-
ity has been shown to correlate negatively with social trust, at least in some studies
(Uslaner 2002; for a study showing no effects see Welch et al. 2007). Although
recent empirical research has indicated little association between associational
involvement and social trust—or, to the extent a relationship exists, reverse
causality—we include this variable to conduct a conservative test of the relationship
between institutional and social trust. The positive outlook associated with
5 We can only include the personality traits in the cross-lagged models (in one of the datasets) as they are
only measured in one wave of the data. However, given the stability of these traits, much of their potential
effect is removed by virtue of analyzing difference within individuals in the fixed effects models.
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optimism is suggested to be projected on to the trustworthiness of other people
(Uslaner 2002), and a wealth of studies have verified the positive relationship
building on cross-sectional data (e.g. Brehm and Rahn 1997; Delhey and Newton
2003; Uslaner 2002). Again, however, it is difficult to rule out the reverse
relationship, but to err on the side of caution we also include optimism to avoid
confounding. However, because including contemporaneous measures of associa-
tional involvement and optimism may likely lead to endogeneity bias, we include
lagged versions of these variables to limit this problem.
In summary, by employing cross-lagged models and fixed effect models, as well
as including a rich set of relevant control variables, we are able to examine the
direction of the relationship between the two forms of trust and rule out a number of
plausible forms of common confounding. This provides us with new leverage for
assessing whether institutional trust exerts a causal impact on social trust.
Data Sources
We use two Danish panel surveys in our analysis: a panel collected in connection
with the Danish part of the European Value Survey (the EVS-DK panel) (Danish
Data Archive 2002, 2009),6 and the Danish Social and Political Attitudes Survey
(SPAPS), which is a panel survey based on the European Social Survey (ESS).7
The EVS panel was collected by means of face-to-face interviews with a random
sample of the Danish adult population in 1990 with subsequent follow-ups in 1999
and 2008. Conversely, SPAPS was collected in 2011/12 as a follow-up survey of
respondents having participated in various rounds of the ESS. Specifically, all
respondents that participated in the first and fourth round of the ESS (conducted in
2002/2003 and 2008/2009, respectively) and 600 randomly selected respondents
that participated in the second round of the survey (conducted in 2004/2005) were
contacted to participate in the SPAPS follow-up survey. While the respondents were
interviewed face-to-face in the ESS, the SPAPS follow-up was collected by means
of a web-survey (CAWI) in which those who did not respond to the web-survey
were subsequently contacted for a telephone interview (CATI). The two panels thus
differ in length with the EVS panel containing three waves over a long period of
time (18 years), and SPAPS containing two waves over a shorter period of time
(between 3 and 9 years). Both surveys are subject to panel attrition. Specifically, of
the 1,030 originally interviewed in 1990 in the EVS panel 442 agreed to participate
in both 1999 and 2008 thus resulting in a retention rate of 43 %. In the SPAPS
panel, the retention rate was 47 %. While panel attrition (as always) compromises
the representativeness of the sample for the population at large, we believe that this
downside is, in our case, outweighed by the improved causal leverage (especially
given the previous scarcity of causal evidence) following from panel data.
6 The full 1990–2008 panel dataset (Danish Data Archive 2009) only includes respondents who chose to
participate in the 2008 wave. We have merged this dataset with the 1990–1999 dataset (Danish Data
Archive 2002) to retain respondents who did not participate in 2008.
7 Data and code for replication are available on the Political Behavior Dataverse webpage at http://dx.
doi.org/10.7910/DVN/12SK8B.
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Finally, in addition to varying in number and length of time lags, mode of data
collection and sample size, the two surveys also vary in how social trust and institutional
trust (and other relevant covariates) are measured as we explain in detail below. While
these differences make it difficult to compare the results across the two panels, we see it
as a way of probing the robustness of the findings. If we are able to produce results that
are qualitatively similar across the two surveys, we take it as a strong indication of their
robustness. Table 1 summarizes the properties of the two panel surveys.
In sum, the Danish data are very well suited for exploring the relationship
between the two types of trust. Relying exclusively on Danish data obviously raises
the question of generalizability. After all, Denmark—along with the other Nordic
countries—is remarkable with respect to high levels of both social trust (Delhey and
Newton 2005; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014) and, to a lesser extent, institutional
trust (Zmerli et al. 2007), which may suggest limited generalizability. We return to
this issue in the conclusion.
Measures
As noted above, both forms of trust are measured differently in the two panel
surveys employed. In the EVS social trust is measured by the frequently used
question, ‘‘Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted or that
you cannot be too careful in dealing with other people?’’ with the dichotomous
response option, ‘‘Most people can be trusted’’ and ‘‘You cannot be too careful’’, of
which the first indicates social trust. In SPAPS, social trust is measured by the
11-point equivalent of the dichotomous trust questions as well as by two items
regarding the fairness (‘‘Do you think that most people would try to take advantage
of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’’) and the helpfulness of
others (‘‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they
are mostly looking out for themselves?’’), which are also measured on 11-point
scales. An additive scale based on the three items showed high internal consistency
(alpha values ranging from 0.72 to 0.76 across waves) and has been shown to
constitute a valid measure of trust in previous studies (Dinesen 2011; Reeskens and
Hooghe 2008; Zmerli and Newton 2008). Table 6 in the Appendix contains more
information about the measures of social trust.
Table 1 Overview over data
Panel EVS-DK SPAPS
Waves (interview year) 3 (1990–1999–2008) 2 (2002/2004/2008–2012)
Response rate (first wave) 74 % 68/65/54 %
Observations (first wave) 1030 1506/600/1610
Response rate (all waves) 43 % 47 %
Observations (all waves) 442 1752
Mode of collection Face to face Wave 1: face to face; Wave 2: CAWI/CATI
Response rate (all waves) and observations (all waves) refer to respondents who responded in all waves of
the survey
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Institutional trust has been measured in different ways in previous studies; much
of the work done in the US has specifically looked at trust in political
institutions/government (Hetherington 1998), whereas most of the work outside
of the US has focused on trust in state institution more broadly defined (Rothstein
and Stolle 2008; Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014; Zmerli and Newton 2008). Here,
we follow the latter approach and measure institutional trust by four questions
tapping trust in different state institutions. Three institutions are common for the
two datasets: the parliament, the judiciary, and the police. The fourth institution is
the public sector in EVS and politicians in SPAPS. The trust questions were
assessed on a four point scale running from ‘‘A great deal’’ to ‘‘none at all’’ in the
EVS panel, whereas they were assessed on an 11-point scale running from ‘‘No trust
at all’’ to ‘‘Trust completely’’ in SPAPS. Rothstein and Stolle (2008) argue in favor
of distinguishing between trust in different types of institutions, but a principal
factor analysis reveals that trust in the four institutions reflect a single latent factor
in both datasets, which is in line with previous findings building on European data
(Zmerli and Newton 2008). Consequently, we constructed a simple additive scale of
institutional trust (ranging from low trust (0) to high trust (1)) based on trust in the
four noted institutions.8 Across the various waves in the panels, the scales showed
internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha values ranging from 0.66 to 0.81.
The issue of measurement of social trust and institutional trust is non-trivial for our
results. Recent research has shown that measurement matters profoundly for the
relationship between the two forms of trust. Zmerli and Newton (2008) thus show that
the relationship is substantially stronger when using more refined and reliable
measures of both forms of trust; i.e. using multi-item scales rather than single items.
This implies that the measures of social trust and institutional trust included in SPAPS
are arguably better suited for examining the (causal) relationship between the two than
the equivalent measure in the EVS panel. Hence, whereas finding no relationship in the
EVS panel may be attributed to weak measurement, detecting a relationship—
especially if it parallels that found in SPAPS—should be taken as a strong indication
that a connection exists.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the two trust variables across the waves in
the two data sets. The data corroborate earlier studies (Sønderskov and Dinesen
2014; Zmerli et al. 2007) in showing elevated levels of institutional trust and
exceptional high levels of social trust in Denmark.
Optimism is operationalized by a measure of life satisfaction, which is considered
to be one of its core components (Uslaner 2002).9 Associational involvement is
measured by a dummy variable separating respondents actively participating in at
8 To assess the robustness of the results reported in the analyses, we tried generating the scales for
institutional and social trust using factor scores instead of simple additive scales. The measures based on
the additive scale and the factor score approaches are very highly correlated (r[ 0.98) and the results of
the analyses of trust are substantively the same regardless of the method.
9 Self-efficacy is another core component of optimism according to Uslaner (2002), but valid measures of
this variable are only available in wave 2 of the SPAPS data. However, including this measure of self-
efficacy in our models when possible does not substantively alter the results.
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least one voluntary organization from non-involved respondents.10 The Big Five
personality traits (specifically, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neu-
roticism, and Openness to Experience) are measured in the second wave of SPAPS by a
brief 10-item inventory—two items for each trait—inspired by previous short batteries
(Mondak 2010). The two indicators of Openness are, however, only weakly correlated,
so we opted for using them separately. Further details about measurement—including
that of the SES and demographic variables—are found in Table 6 in the Appendix.
Analysis
We now turn to the empirical analysis. We first examine the causal relationship
between the two forms of trust by means of cross-lagged models and subsequently
employ fixed effects models to address common confounding.
Direction of the Relationship: Cross-Lagged Models
We estimate parallel cross-lagged models for both types of trust, but start with the
models of primary interest, that is, the models with social trust as the dependent
variable. These are reported in Table 3. To facilitate comparison, we report parallel
models based on SPAPS and the EVS panel with two exceptions: we include two lags
in the analyses based on the EVS panel, but only one in the SPAPS panel (because the
latter only contains two waves), and we control for personality only in the SPAPS
panel (because this variable is not available in the EVS panel). Despite model
similarity, the results can mainly be compared with regard to the significance of the
independent variables as the coefficients are not comparable given the diverging
measurement of social trust in the two datasets (continuous versus dichotomous). Six
cross-lagged models are estimated for each type of trust. Model 1 (SPAPS) and 2
Table 2 Trust levels across panels and waves
Data Social trust Institutional trust
Mean SD n Mean SD n
SPAPS, wave 1, 2002 0.70 0.15 618 0.69 0.15 595
SPAPS, wave 1, 2004 0.69 0.16 265 0.69 0.14 265
SPAPS, wave 1, 2008 0.69 0.16 845 0.68 0.16 845
SPAPS, wave 2, 2012 0.72 0.15 1728 0.68 0.16 1728
EVS-DK, wave 1, 1990 0.71 – 326 0.60 0.16 326
EVS-DK, wave 2, 1999 0.75 – 326 0.59 0.15 326
EVS-DK, wave 3, 2008 0.81 – 326 0.65 0.15 326
The descriptive statistics are based on the respondents included in Models 1 (SPAPS) and 2 (EVS-DK),
respectively
10 This measure is arguably crude, and a measure based on the specific composition of associations
(related to the distinction between bonding and bridging associations; cf. Putnam 2000) would have been
preferable.
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(EVS) are the simple cross-lagged models without control variables. Model 3
(SPAPS) and 4 (EVS) add the control variables available in both panels (with the
potentially endogenous control variables, associational activity and life satisfaction,
lagged in the same way as the trust variables). In model 5 and 6 we omit associational
activity because non-response on this variable leads to a marked drop in sample size
(see Table 6 in the Appendix).11 The latter models thus prioritize representativeness
and statistical precision over potential bias from an omitted variable.
Looking at the six models with social trust as the dependent variable in Table 3,
we see that previous levels of institutional trust at t-1 are significantly correlated
with subsequent levels of social trust in all models, while the correlation is
insignificant for institutional trust at time t-2 in the EVS panel. In other words,
institutional trust measured with one time lag is robustly and positively related to
social trust independent of the survey used (and thus the measurement of social
trust). Given that we have included lagged versions of social trust and a rich set of
control variables we take this as a clear indication that institutional trust exerts a
causal impact on social trust. It is also worth noting that lagged institutional trust is
significantly related to social trust regardless of when wave 1 of the SPAPS panel
was collected as shown in Fig. 1 (left panels). The figure shows the average effect of
institutional trust (the effect reported in Table 3) as well as the marginal effect of
institutional trust depending on the year of data collection of the first wave
(estimated with an interaction between survey round/year and institutional trust).12
Based on the estimates from Model 5, the predicted effect of an increase in
institutional trust from its minimum to its maximum value (zero to one) is 0.14 on
the social trust scale (also scaled from zero to one). Basing the effect on a more
modest change in institutional trust—the interquartile range (0.60–0.80)—suggests a
smaller, but non-trivial effect of 0.03. The corresponding effects based on Model
6—here expressed as the change in the average predicted probabilities for
expressing trust—are 0.40 (changing institutional trust from minimum to maximum)
and 0.06 (a change over the interquartile range).13 Although the effects are modest,
it is notable that the effect of institutional trust is relatively strong compared to the
other predictors in the models, and it is also the only predictor that is consistently
significant across all models. Previous levels of social trust are also significantly
related to subsequent levels of social trust in all models, thus suggesting that the
relative ordering of individuals in social trust is rather stable over time. The
personality trait Agreeableness also shows a positive relationship with trust, which
squares with previous findings in the literature (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Dinesen
et al. 2014). The measures of two prominent alternative explanations of social trust
in the literature, associational activity and life satisfaction (optimism), are not
consistently significant and the same generally goes for the remaining control
11 This is most pronounced in SPAPS because questions regarding associational activity were only asked
in one of the three surveys comprising wave 1 (specifically, in round 1).
12 Note that Model 3 only contains data for the first wave from 2002/3 (due to inclusion of associational
activity, which is only measured in this wave in SPAPS, so there are no heterogeneous effects to report
from this model).
13 The change in the average predicted probabilities are based on the observed value approach (Hanmer
and Kalkan 2013), in which all covariates are held at their observed values for each unit.
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variables. In other words, institutional trust not only exerts a causal impact on social
trust, it is also the strongest and most consistent predictor compared to the long list
of ostensibly important control variables in the models.
What about the reverse relationship? Table 4 reports cross-lagged models equivalent
to those reported in Table 3, but with institutional trust as dependent variable
(consequently, the models are dubbed Model 1it and so forth). As we are mainly
interested in the potential feedback loop from social trust to institutional trust, we only
report the coefficients on social trust and omit the coefficients for the control variables
from the table. The results are less consistent than in the models with social trust as the
dependent variable and differ slightly between the two surveys. They suggest a weak
effect or no effect of social trust on institutional trust. In the EVS panel, the coefficients for
social trust are not only insignificant, but also essentially zero. In SPAPS, the effect of
social trust on institutional trust is significant in Model 1it and 5it, but not in Model 3it.
Moreover, the right panels of Fig. 1 reveals that lagged social trust—in contrast to the
Table 5 Individual-level fixed effects model of social trust
Model 7 8 9 10
Data SPAPS SPAPS EVS-DK EVS-DK
Institutional trust 0.18** (4.34) 0.24** (9.38) 1.19 (1.64) 1.50* (2.24)
Life satisfaction 0.14** (3.67) 0.12** (5.18) 0.28 (0.48) 0.30 (0.59)
Organizational activity 0.03** (2.62) 0.30 (1.37)
Religiosity 0.01 (0.34) 0.04* (2.22) -0.35 (-0.68) -0.42 (-0.90)
Highest education
Primary school Reference
Vocational -0.01 (-0.37) 0.02 (1.27) -0.20 (-0.54) -0.08 (-0.27)
Shorter post-secondary 0.00 (0.06) 0.02 (1.83) -0.34 (-0.84) -0.15 (-0.44)
Medium-long post-secondary 0.01 (0.23) 0.02 (1.33) 0.23 (0.40) 0.11 (0.22)
Relative income t0
Below 25 percentile Reference
Within IQR -0.00 (-0.10) -0.01 (-1.47) 0.47 (1.78) 0.35 (1.47)
Above 75 percentile 0.01 (0.52) -0.00 (-0.17) 0.35 (0.95) 0.39 (1.15)
Not disclosed -0.02 (-0.98) -0.01 (-1.32) -0.63 (-1.87) -0.51 (-1.68)
Unemployed (yes) 0.02 (0.57) 0.01 (0.48) 0.47 (0.95) 0.12 (0.27)
Constant 0.44** (10.00) 0.37** (12.95) – –
N (observations/individuals) 1156/579 3282/1642 593/249 710/297
All models are estimated using individual fixed effects and also include time dummy/dummies. Models 7
and 8 are estimated using a linear fixed effects estimator, while Models 9 and 10 are estimated using the
fixed effects logit estimator. Entries are estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Note
that models based on the three wave EVS data also include respondents that were only interviewed twice,
which explains why the number of observations does not equal three times the number of individuals in
these models
**;* p\ 0.01; 0.05 (Two-sided test)
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effect of lagged institutional trust on social trust—is only significantly related to
institutional trust for respondents interviewed first time in 2008/9 across the three models.
In the SPAPS panel, both types of trust are measured using a scale based on items
having identical range and the resulting scales have approximately the same variance
(cf. Table 2). This allows us—with some caution—to compare the estimated effects of
institutional trust on social trust with the reverse effect. As witnessed by Fig. 1, the
effect of social trust on institutional trust is consistently smaller than the reverse effect
and typically close to half in size. Although none of the coefficients are significantly
different across the two dependent variables, the many instances of insignificant
effects of social trust combined with its consistently lower coefficients lead us to
conclude that—on balance—there are only weak indications of a feedback effect from
social trust to institutional trust. In conclusion, the cross-lagged models collectively
provide clear evidence for a causal impact of institutional trust on social trust, while
there is some evidence of social trust exerting a limited impact on institutional trust.
Taking the results from the cross-lagged models regarding the causality between
the two forms of trust as point of departure, we treat institutional trust as the
exogenous variable in the fixed effect models below. However, given that a
feedback effect from social trust to institutional trust cannot be completely ruled
out, we acknowledge that some endogeneity bias due to reversed causality may be
present in the fixed effects models. Nevertheless, these models still serve to
illuminate whether the relationship between the two forms of trust is confounded by
unobserved time-invariant factors.
Assessing Confounding: Individual Fixed Effects Models
Having found a significant effect of lagged institutional trust on subsequent social trust
while controlling for prior levels of social trust, we already have an indication that our
results are not subject to confounding by stable unobservable factors as these would to
some extent be picked up by preceding levels of social trust. However, we now conduct an
alternative test of this by using fixed effects estimation, which relates mean deviations in
institutional trust to mean deviations in social trust within individuals over time, and thus
bypasses confounding by time-invariant unobservables (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
Table 5 reports four fixed effects models with social trust as the dependent variable, two
based on SPAPS (Model 7 and 8) and two based on the EVS (Model 9 and 10). The models
also include time-varying control variables. As in the cross-lagged models, including
associational involvement leads to a marked drop in observations (especially in SPAPS, cf.
note 8) and we therefore estimate models both with and without this variable.14
The results reported in Table 5 strongly suggest that the relationship between
institutional trust and social trust is not confounded by time-invariant unobservables
(or the other time-varying independent variables in the model). Institutional trust
thus displays a positive significant relationship with social trust in three out of four
models (it only fails to reach significance in the model based on the fewest
observations), which shows that individual-level changes in social trust generally
14 Note also that the logistic fixed-effects estimator only uses individuals with variation in the dependent
variable (social trust) across waves, which implies that the test is performed on a limited sample.
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track changes in institutional trust. Based on the coefficients from Model 8 and 10, a
change over the range of mean deviations in institutional trust is predicted to
increase social trust by 0.34 and 0.30 (on the 0–1 scale), respectively (the latter
effect is the average change in the predicted probability of expressing social trust).
Restricting the change in institutional trust to the interquartile range of within-
person mean deviations (0.18 for both models), the predicted changes in social trust
are 0.04 and 0.06, respectively. Again, this points to modest, but non-trivial effects
of institutional trust. Moreover, institutional trust again emerges as the variable most
consistently significantly related to social trust. While it is less surprising that, for
example, education does not have a significant impact on trust given the limited
within-individual variation in a panel survey of adults, it is revealing that no
consistent effect is found for the two other prominent explanations of trust relating
to life satisfaction and associational involvement. This further adds to the picture of
institutional trust being the single-most important predictor of social trust—and an
influence that cannot readily be explained by time-invariant unobservable factors.
Conclusion and Discussion
The aim of this paper has been to examine whether the well documented association
between institutional and social trust reported in previous cross-sectional studies can
plausibly be given a causal interpretation; more specifically, that institutional trust
influences social trust. Using two individual-level panel datasets from Denmark, this is
indeed what we find. Employing cross-lagged models to assess the direction of causality
and fixed effects models to rule out confounding by plausible, but hard-to-observe, time-
invariant confounding factors, we find strong evidence of institutional trust influencing
social trust. Moreover, in comparative terms, institutional trust emerges as the most
important predictor of social trust when controlling for a rich set of likely confounders.
Finally, our results are inconsistent with regard to the reverse relationship, but a more
limited feedback effect from social trust to institutional trust cannot be ruled out.
Our findings have marked implications for our understanding of the roots of social
trust. Contrary to the cultural account, which argues that social trust is a deep-founded
dispositional trait, our results clearly suggest that social trust is likely to change over
time, and that experiences that shape trust in state institutions play an important part in
this regard. This is good news in the sense that it testifies to levels of social trust not
being set in stone, but rather something that can be built up by means of combatting
corruption and other institutional malfunctions that lead citizens to distrust institutions
and, subsequently, other people (Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014). However, as the other
side of the coin, this also implies that drops in institutional quality can erode social trust,
and policy-makers should thus be conscious about how corruption and specific policies
may affect trust in institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2003; Serritzlew et al. 2014).
As a considerable strength of our design, we have shown that our findings are robust to
various measurements of the dependent variable and over a significant time span.
However, as always when focusing on data from one specific country, one might
reasonably question the external validity of the results. That is, do our results concerning
the causal influence of institutional trust on social trust generalize to other settings? We
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cannot know without hard data, but prima facie there is no reason to believe that Denmark
is an environment particularly prone for a positive relationship between the two forms of
trust. On the contrary, one could argue that given the high preexisting levels of social trust
and institutional trust in Denmark, there should be less room for any effects of
improvement in the latter (and perceptions hereof) on the former. Whether the effects in
other countries are stronger—or in the same direction for that matter—remain to be seen.
The availability of comparable cross-national panel data sets including the relevant trust
variables would clearly be a marked improvement in this regard.
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Appendix
See Table 6.
Table 6 Measurement of variables
Variable Measurement in EVS-DK Measurement in SPAPS
Social trust Response to question: ‘‘Generally speaking,
do you think that most people can be
trusted or that you cannot be too careful in
dealing with other people?’’
0 = ‘‘You cannot be too careful’’
1 = ‘‘Most people can be trusted’’
Scale consisting of the following three
questions:
‘‘Generally speaking would you say that
most people can be trusted, or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with
people’’
‘‘Do you think that most people would try to
take advantage of you if they got the
chance, or would they try to be fair?’’
‘‘Would you say that most of the time
people try to be helpful or that they are
mostly looking out for themselves?’’
All questions were measured on an eleven-
point scale ranging from 0 (‘‘You can’t be
too careful’’/’’Most people would try to
take advantage of me’’/’’People mostly
look out for themselves’’) to 10 (‘‘Most
people can be trusted’’/’’Most people
would try to be fair’’/’’People mostly try to
be helpful’’)
The final scale is calculated as the mean of
the three items and rescaled from 0 to 1
with high values indicating high trust. It
only includes respondents having validly
answered at least two of the three
questions. The composite scale has a
Cronbach’s alpha between 0.72 and 0.76 in
the various waves of SPAPS
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Table 6 continued
Variable Measurement in EVS-DK Measurement in SPAPS
Institutional trust Scale consisting of trust in the following four
state institutions: the parliament, the
judiciary, the police, and the public sector.
The trust questions were assessed on a four
point scale running from ‘‘A great deal’’ to
‘‘none at all’’. The final scale was
calculated as the mean of the four items
and rescaled to range from 0 and 1 with
high values indicating high trust. It only
includes respondents having validly
answered at three of the four questions.
The composite scale has a Cronbach’s
alpha between 0.66 and 0.70 across the
three waves
Scale consisting of trust in the following four
state institutions: the parliament, the
judiciary, the police, and politicians
The trust questions were assessed on an
11-point scale running from ‘‘No trust at
all’’ to ‘‘Trust completely’’
The final scale was calculated as the mean of
the four items and rescaled to range from 0
and 1 with high values indicating high
trust. It only includes respondents having
validly answered at least three of the four
questions. The composite scale has a
Cronbach’s alpha between 0.76 and 0.81
Associational
activity
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent reports being active or doing
voluntary work for at least one type of voluntary association. The list of possible
associations varies slightly across the surveys, but all surveys include a broad catch-all
category. The battery used to measure involvement was not included in the 2004 and 2008
versions of the SPAPS data. For unknown reasons the response rate for this question was
low in the 1990 EVS-DK data
Life satisfaction ‘‘How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with
life nowadays?’’. Measured on a ten-point
scale ranging from 1 (‘‘Very dissatisfied’’)
to 10 (‘‘Very satisfied’’). Rescaled from 0
to 1
‘‘All things considered, how satisfied are you
with your life nowadays?’’ Measured on an
11-point scale ranging from 0 (‘‘Very
dissatisfied’’) to 10 (‘‘Very satisfied’’).
Rescaled from 0 to 1
Religiosity ’’How important is God in your life’’.
Measured on a ten-point scale ranging
from 1 (‘‘Not at all important’’’) to 10
(‘‘Very important’’’). Rescaled from 0 to 1
‘‘How religious are you?’’. Measured on an
11-point scale ranging from 0 (‘‘Not at all
religious’’) to 10 (‘‘Very religious’’).
Rescaled from 0 to 1
Big five personality
traits
Respondents’ self-placement on ten
statements consisting of the word pairs
listed below. Each word marked the
extreme of an 11-point continuum on
which the respondent was asked to place
her-/himself. All scales/variables are
rescaled from 0 to 1 with higher values
indicating higher scores on the trait. All
items are only included in the second wave
of SPAPS
Agreeableness ‘‘Cold’’ (0) vs. ‘‘Warm’’ (10); ‘‘Friendly’’ (0)
vs. ‘‘Unfriendly’’ (10) (reversed)
Correlation between the two items, r = 0.35.
Calculated as the mean of the two items
Conscientiousness ‘‘Hardworking’’ (0) vs. ‘‘Lazy’’ (10)
(reversed); ‘‘Responsible’’ (0) vs.
‘‘Irresponsible’’ (10) (reversed). r = 0.29.
Calculated as the mean of the two items
Extraversion ‘‘Introverted’’ (0) vs. ‘‘Extraverted’’ (10);
‘‘Quiet’’ (0) vs. ‘‘Talkative’’ (10)
r = 0.59. Calculated as the mean
of the two items
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